Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

Living Edition
| Editors: Mortimer Sellers, Stephan Kirste

Philosophy of Civil Procedure

  • Michele TaruffoEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_354-1


In very general terms, civil procedure is a means for solving civil disputes, but first of all such a definition requires to determine which disputes are “civil.” In a sense they deal with the application, in concrete cases, of the “civil law,” including various areas such as property, contracts, torts, family, labor law, and so on and including also individual and collective disputes. Then criminal and administrative disputes (and in some systems also constitutional disputes), as well as supranational and international disputes, do not belong to the area of civil procedure. However, the distinction between what is and what is not a civil dispute may vary to some extent in the several legal systems.


Referring to a civil matter, a relevant problem is to understand what is properly a “procedure.” Once again in very general terms, a procedure is an organized sequence of acts, usually performed by different subjects: private parties, lawyers, prosecutors, experts,...

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Pavia UniversityPaviaItaly

Section editors and affiliations

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
    • 1
  1. 1.Università degli Studi di GenovaGenovaItaly