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Defining and Measuring Human Well-Being

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Global Environmental Change

Part of the book series: Handbook of Global Environmental Pollution ((EGEP,volume 1))

Abstract

Human well-being is a complex concept that has been contested across the social and political sciences. This chapter considers three broad approaches to the concept and measurement of human well-being along with their respective merits from a cross-disciplinary perspective. The three broad approaches in question embrace utility (happiness, desire fulfillment, and preference), material well-being (most notably, income and resources), and “list-orientated” views (needs, rights, and capabilities). The final part of the chapter explicitly links human well-being with environmental issues and various notions of sustainable development. It is suggested that the idea of “sustainable human development” can help resolve the apparent tension between poverty reduction (involving more consumption) on the one hand and environmental conservation and sustainability on the other. Above all, a more comprehensive account of human well-being is required to bridge the gap between mental and physical states and to take note of the environmental and material basis of sustainable well-being.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The World Health Organization defines health in terms of well-being: “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO 1948, p. 1). Of course, it is possible to challenge such concepts. Many people choose lifestyles with unhealthy elements (drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes); and on occasions even apparently “healthy” activities can be harmful (over dieting, excessive exercise) (see Clark 2002, 2005).

  2. 2.

    Secondary definitions refer to the “satisfactory condition (of a thing)” and “individual instances of welfare.” The focus here is entirely on human well-being. I also set aside the discussion of well-being and morality (except insofar as moral conduct is thought to contribute to living and faring well). See Griffin (1986), Crisp and Hooker (2000), and Crisp (2008) on morality and well-being.

  3. 3.

    Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) account of happiness as the sole basis of goodness devotes an entire chapter to cataloging 14 distinct types of pleasure and 12 kinds of pain. Some of the sources of these pleasures and pains are reminiscent of various capabilities, needs, and rights.

    There is a strong case for installing “time” in terms of the duration of relevant experiences (Clark and Hulme 2010) and “sustainability” (discussed presently) as additional features of well-being.

  4. 4.

    In contrast to the former, the latter usually takes the form of an independent assessment of human flourishing or need. An analogous distinction relates to “hedonic” and “eudaimonic” well-being (see Ryan and Deci 2001).

  5. 5.

    Gay Meeks has reminded me that Sen later recognizes this criticism will not apply if the person in question has an “undentable” cheery disposition. The argument that the disabled will become “doubly worse off” also depends on the implicit assumption that other people’s utility functions will not be adversely affected.

  6. 6.

    At the extreme we might regard some types of utility (e.g., the pleasure or satisfaction derived from subjecting another person to a lesser liberty) as “wrong” and argue the case for striking these pleasures or desires from utility functions (e.g., Rawls 1971, p. 31). Jim Griffin argues that similar criticisms apply to the desire fulfillment view of utility which is considered presently. He considers the case for excluding “immoral desires” such as those based on sadistic wishes (Griffin 1986, Chap. 2).

  7. 7.

    Consider Mill’s (1861) classic conclusion: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question” (p. 140). Sugden (2006, pp. 43–4) reminds us that Mill’s utilitarianism should not be confused with his liberalism: Mill holds that social evils such as drunkenness and gambling should be permitted (as long as no harm comes to others), even though these activities are harmful to the agent’s own happiness and well-being.

  8. 8.

    The adaptation argument is considered shortly.

  9. 9.

    The “revealed preference” approach has helped to make economics a respectful empirical science, although it has been criticized by some economists (e.g., Hahn and Hollis 1979, Chap. 1; Meeks 1991). In particular, Sen (2002, esp. Chap. 3) has expressed concerns about the “internal consistency of choice” by maintaining that some choices violate basic axioms of rationality such as transitivity.

  10. 10.

    In particular, there may be a case for excluding immoral or sadistic desires such as “hate, envy, spite, prejudice and intolerance” (see Griffin 1986, pp. 24, 25–26) – especially if these desires are permitted to affect other people’s well-being.

  11. 11.

    See, for example, Brickman and Campbell (1971); Diener, Lucas, and Scollon (2006); and Layard (2006, Chap. 4). The hedonic treadmill is consistent with the “Easterlin Paradox” – the finding that rapid growth in the advanced economies since the 1950s is associated with stable or declining happiness scores (Easterlin 1974).

  12. 12.

    In theory, the hedonic treadmill also works in reverse (a decline in income produces lower aspirations), although there is some evidence to suggest that adaptation is asymmetric: people adapt more to a rise in income but less so to a decline in income (see Clark 2012).

  13. 13.

    Nozick is also concerned that an experience machine would limit the world to a manmade construct that prevents the exploration of deeper realities (although the experience can be simulated).

  14. 14.

    The distinctions between experienced utility (including instant and remembered forms) and decision utility employed in this section have origins in the writings of Daniel Kahneman (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1997) and also feature in several of the chapters collected in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz (1999). Kahneman’s use of these terms has evolved over the years.

  15. 15.

    Layard (2006, pp.17–20) and Colander (2007) describe some of the breakthroughs in neuroscience and brain wave analysis that make the hedonimeter more of a practical possibility than a farfetched proposal.

  16. 16.

    In addition to remembered utility (retrospective happiness), other measures might include perceptions of current or future happiness as well as “life satisfaction” which Kahneman believes captures something more than experienced utility (see Jarden 2011).

  17. 17.

    The following discussion sets aside domain-specific questions that focus on subjective impressions of particular aspects of life (health, relationships, housing, work, finances, children, etc).

  18. 18.

    See WVS (2011) and questions V10 and V21. For a catalog of single-item happiness and life satisfaction questions derived from leading surveys, see Dolan, Peasgood, and White (2008, appendix A).

  19. 19.

    The British Household Survey and Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey both have scales with neutral middle points.

  20. 20.

    Studies show that single-item measures possess “moderate reliability” over time and correlate with external factors and other subjective well-being measures. For further discussions, see Diener (1984) and Krueger and Schkade (2008).

  21. 21.

    Many attempts have been made to measure subjective well-being at the national, regional, and global levels. Noteworthy examples include the UK’s so-called “happiness” index (Self et al. 2012), the Cambridge Well-Being Institute’s study of happiness levels across Europe (Huppert and So 2013), and the analysis of satisfaction data from the Gallup World Survey (Deaton 2008). In 2012 the first World Happiness Report was launched at the United Nations (Halliwell et al. 2012).

  22. 22.

    A fact long recognized by economists and their critics alike. See, for example, Hicks and Streeten (1979), Oswald (1997), and Daly (2006, p. 657).

  23. 23.

    Various adjustments to GNP have been proposed. A noteworthy example is William Nordhaus and James Tobin’s “Measure of Economic Welfare” discussed by Hicks and Streeten (1979) and Daly (2006).

  24. 24.

    A minimally decent form of life is typically defined in terms of health, nutrition, and literacy levels (Stewart 1996, p. 46). While BNA II endorses broader goals, practical applications tend to focus on material goods and services (Stewart 2006, p. 16).

  25. 25.

    Elsewhere I have argued that some other accounts of need (especially “human need,” “genuine needs,” and “authentic needs”) are susceptible to paternalism (Clark 2002, 2012, Chap. 3).

  26. 26.

    The quotation here is from David Ross’s translation of Nicomachean Ethics, book I (Oxford World Classics), 1095b5–7, which is slightly different from the translation provided by Irwin cited in the bibliography. I have stuck with the Ross translation, as it is frequently referred to in the well-being literature by Sen and others.

  27. 27.

    Several companion measures such as the Human Poverty Index, Gender-Related Index, and inequality-adjusted HDI have been developed (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/). Early attempts to develop a Political Freedom Index and Human Freedom Index were discontinued on the grounds that they were based on “qualitative judgments, not quantifiable empirical data” (UNDP 2000, p. 91).

  28. 28.

    At the time of writing, country ranking only appeared to be available through Wikipedia. The project website includes a useful summary of the EVI, including technical details of the mechanics of the index and a description of the 50 “smart indicators” utilized. (http://www.sopac.org/index.php/environmental-vulnerability-index).

  29. 29.

    The UNDP (2011) suggests that investing in equity is an important step toward sustainable human development for current and future generations.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Gay Meeks for helpful comments on drafts of this chapter. In writing this chapter, I have benefited enormously from Gay Meeks’ “Philosophical Issues in Economics” lectures at Cambridge University (now part of the MPhil in Development Studies) and from interactions with talented students following this course. I am also indebted to Mozaffar Qizilbash for many helpful conversations over the years. The structure and shape of this chapter has been influenced by the writings of Jim Griffin, Amartya Sen, and Roger Crisp. The usual disclaimers apply. © David A. Clark, 2013.

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Clark, D.A. (2014). Defining and Measuring Human Well-Being. In: Freedman, B. (eds) Global Environmental Change. Handbook of Global Environmental Pollution, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5784-4_66

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