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Moral Cognition: Introduction

  • Stephan Schleim
Reference work entry

Abstract

Research on moral cognition is a growing and heavily multidisciplinary field. This section contains chapters addressing foundational psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical issues of research on moral decision-making. Furthermore, beyond summarizing the state of the art of their respective fields, the authors formulate their own proposals to answer open questions such as those on the relation between emotion and cognition in moral psychology, the idea that there is a “moral module” in the human brain, the relevance of this research for ethics and meta-ethics, the various psychological and philosophical meanings of “intuition” and how intuitions can have a justificatory role, or the connection between the psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical levels in popular experiments on moral cognition. Research on moral decision-making is challenging, for empiricists as well as theoreticians, and is related to several applied questions of neuroethics which are briefly addressed at the end of this introduction.

Keywords

Emotion Regulation Moral Judgment Moral Philosophy Moral Belief Normative Ethic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Michael von Grundherr, Felix Schirmann, and Steffen Steinert for helpful suggestions to improve a previous version of this chapter.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Theory and History of Psychology, Heymans Institute for Psychological ResearchUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Neurophilosophy, Munich Center for NeurosciencesLudwig-Maximilians-University MunichMunichGermany

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