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Consequentialism and Virtue

  • Robert J. HartmanEmail author
  • Joshua W. Bronson
Living reference work entry
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Abstract

We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver’s consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her position, and critically analyze them. We conclude that one of those proposed revisions would improve her account.

Keywords

Consequentialism Virtue Character Luck Julia Driver 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyStockholm UniversityStockholmSweden
  2. 2.Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteoriGothenburg UniversityGothenburgSweden

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