Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers

Two-Sided Matching Models

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_572-2

Definition of the Subject

This entry describes the basic elements of the cooperative and noncooperative approaches for two-sided matching models and analyzes the fundamental differences and similarities between some of these models.

Basic Definitions

Feasible outcome

is an outcome that is specified by the rules of the game. In the discrete case, a feasible outcome is a feasible matching μ or at least corresponds to a feasible matching. The usual definition is the following. The matching μ is feasible if it matches every agent to an allowable set of partners and μ(f)∈Chf(μ(f)∩W) and μ(w)∈Chw(μ(w)∩F) for every (f,w)∈F × W. Then, if preferences are responsive, every matched pair is mutually acceptable. An implication of this definition is that a feasible outcome is always individually rational.

In the continuous case, the rules of the game may specify, for example, whether the agents negotiate their payoffs individually within each partnership or if they negotiate in blocks. In the former...

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Competitive Equilibrium Marriage Market Stable Matchings Stable Payoff 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Sao PauloSao PauloBrazil
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA