The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies

Living Edition
| Editors: Scott Romaniuk, Manish Thapa, Péter Marton

Civilian Control of Armed Forces

  • Tuba EldemEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_11-1

Introduction

The question of “civilian control” or “how to guard the guardians” has been a central issue within the subfield of civil-military relations (CMR), since Plato’s Republicwritten more than 2500 years ago. The states need strong armies to defend their borders, but armed forces strong enough to protect the state also pose a threat to the civilian leadership. Enjoying important political advantages vis-à-vis the executive power such as “a highly emotionalized symbolic status,” “a marked superiority in organization,” and most importantly “a monopoly of arms,” why the armed forces ever obey civilian masters (Finer 1962, p. 6)? How can civilian leaders reliably get the military to obey when civilian and military preferences diverge?” How could the civilian democratic control can be established, enhanced, and assessed? This entry differentiates between the concepts of civilian and democratic control, classifies the research on the basis of the method that they use to measure the...

Keywords

Civil-military relations Democratic control of armed forces Civilian control of military Guardianship dilemma Civil-military problematique 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fenerbahce UniversityIstanbulTurkey