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Game-Theoretic Learning in Distributed Control

  • Jason R. Marden
  • Jeff S. Shamma
Reference work entry

Abstract

In distributed architecture control problems, there is a collection of interconnected decision-making components that seek to realize desirable collective behaviors through local interactions and by processing local information. Applications range from autonomous vehicles to energy to transportation. One approach to control of such distributed architectures is to view the components as players in a game. In this approach, two design considerations are the components’ incentives and the rules that dictate how components react to the decisions of other components. In game-theoretic language, the incentives are defined through utility functions, and the reaction rules are online learning dynamics. This chapter presents an overview of this approach, covering basic concepts in game theory, special game classes, measures of distributed efficiency, utility design, and online learning rules, all with the interpretation of using game theory as a prescriptive paradigm for distributed control design.

Keywords

Learning in games Evolutionary games Multiagent systems Distributed decision systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA
  2. 2.Computer, Electrical and Mathematical Science and Engineering Division (CEMSE)King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)ThuwalSaudi Arabia

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