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Corporate Governance

  • Carsten BurhopEmail author
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Abstract

This article provides information on how financiers of public limited companies in the past ensured that they achieved a return on and a return of their investment. I am investigating this with examples from the USA, Great Britain and Germany. First, I examine when and to what extent public limited companies were formed and whether and to what extent ownership and control were separate. Moreover, control and incentive mechanisms, e.g. monitoring by supervisory board or incentive pay to managers, are investigated.

Keywords

Corporate governance Joint-stock companies United States Britain Germany Executive compensation 
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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BonnBonnGermany

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