Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
2015; Demaine, Hajiaghayi, Mahini, Zadimoghaddam
Problem Definition
Over the last few decades, a wide variety of networks have emerged. The general structure of these networks including their global connectivity properties has been studied extensively. On the other hand, strategic aspects of them are also very interesting to explore by considering the nodes as independent agents. The exciting area of network creation games attempts to understand how real-world networks (such as the Internet) develop when multiple independent agents (e.g., ISPs) build pieces of the network to selfishly improve their own objective functions which heavily depend on their connectivity properties.
We start by elaborating on these connectivity objectives and its relation to the global design and structure of the network. Network design is a fundamental family of problems at the intersection between computer science and operations research, amplified in importance...
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Roughgarden T (2002) Selfish routing. PhD thesis, Cornell University
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Demaine, E.D., Hajiaghayi, M.T., Mahini, H., Zadimoghaddam, M. (2016). Network Creation Games. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_752
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