Encyclopedia of Algorithms

2016 Edition
| Editors: Ming-Yang Kao

Network Creation Games

  • Erik D. DemaineEmail author
  • Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi
  • Hamid Mahini
  • Morteza Zadimoghaddam
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_752

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • 2015; Demaine, Hajiaghayi, Mahini, Zadimoghaddam

Problem Definition

Over the last few decades, a wide variety of networks have emerged. The general structure of these networks including their global connectivity properties has been studied extensively. On the other hand, strategic aspects of them are also very interesting to explore by considering the nodes as independent agents. The exciting area of network creation games attempts to understand how real-world networks (such as the Internet) develop when multiple independent agents (e.g., ISPs) build pieces of the network to selfishly improve their own objective functions which heavily depend on their connectivity properties.

We start by elaborating on these connectivity objectives and its relation to the global design and structure of the network. Network design is a fundamental family of problems at the intersection between computer science and operations research, amplified in importance...

Keywords

Game theory Network formation Price of anarchy Small-world phenomenon 
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Recommended Reading

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Erik D. Demaine
    • 1
    Email author
  • Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi
    • 2
  • Hamid Mahini
    • 3
  • Morteza Zadimoghaddam
    • 4
  1. 1.MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  3. 3.Departmentof Computer Science, University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  4. 4.Google ResearchNew YorkUSA