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Avoidance

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Abstract

The term “Avoidance” avoids clear definition in the academic literature. It generally describes illegitimate reactions to legal rules that wholly or partially thwart their legal effect. Self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals are obviously expected to try avoiding legal restrictions and limitations to their behavior. Indeed, examples of avoidance in reality are abundant. Research on avoidance was initiated by the economics of crimes literature in the 1970’s and developed since in two additional spinoffs of that literature – environmental economics and economics of tax evasion. These developments are organized and reviewed here. The focus is on the relationship between avoidance and deterrence.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel

    Jacob Nussim

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  1. Jacob Nussim
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Correspondence to Jacob Nussim .

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  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Nussim, J. (2019). Avoidance. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_77-1

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