Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello


  • Pavel KuchařEmail author
Living reference work entry

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_30-2


How does the process of consensus formation affect the accuracy and reliability of our knowledge? Cognitive and epistemic division of labor creates a problem of trust in the use and application of knowledge. Consequently, the reliability of scientific consensus depends on whether the incentives, which the self-interested members of scientific communities face, are aligned in the right way.


Expert Consensus Justify Belief Scientific Consensus Prediction Market Public Deliberation 
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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of Guanajuato, DCEA-Sede MarfilGuanajuatoMexico