Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Crime: Economics of, Different Paradigms

  • Sven GrünerEmail author
  • Norbert Hirschauer
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_695

Definition

Economics of crime describes the attempt to explain rule-breaking behaviors based on the assumption that people make purposive choices under conditions of scarcity.

Economics of Crime: Different Paradigms

Economics of crime can be broadly defined as the attempt to explain rule-breaking behaviors based on the assumption that people make purposive choices under conditions of scarcity. People’s choice sets regularly contain both permissible and illicit choices. Illicit choices do not always constitute criminal acts in terms of violations of the criminal law. However, throughout this entry we use crime, illegal behavior, illicit choice, noncompliance, offense, and rule breaking as interchangeable terms for the infringement of formal (codified) rules. Economics of crime includes the analysis of economic crimeand white-collar crime such as corruption, patent infringements, or the violation of industrial safety laws, but it explicitly applies economic approaches to the study of...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Ayres I, Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive regulation: transcending the deregulation debate. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  2. Beccaria C (1764) Dei delitti e delle pene. English edition: Bellamy R (ed) (1995) On crimes and punishments and other writings (trans: Davies R et al.). Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76(2):169–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bentham J (1789) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Braithwaite J (2002) Rewards and regulation. J Law Soc 29(1):12–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Braithwaite V (2009) Defiance in taxation and governance: resisting and dismissing authority in a democracy. Edward Elgar, NorthamptonGoogle Scholar
  7. Dhami S (2016) The foundations of behavioral economic analysis. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  8. Ehrlich I (1975) The deterrent effect of capital punishment: a question of life and death. Am Econ Rev 65(3): 397–417Google Scholar
  9. Frey BS (1997) Not just for the money. An economic theory of personal motivation. Edward Elgar Publishing, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  10. Gigerenzer G (2010) Moral satisficing: rethinking moral behavior as bounded rationality. Top Cogn Sci 2(3):528–554CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Gigerenzer G, Todd PM (1999) Simple heuristics that make US smart. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  12. Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000) A fine is a price. J Leg Stud 29(1):1–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Harcourt BE (2014) Beccaria’s on crimes and punishments: a mirror on the history of the foundations of modern criminal law. In: Dubber MD (ed) Foundational texts in modern criminal law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 39–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Harel A (2014) Criminal law as an efficiency-enhancing device: the contribution of Gary Becker. In: Dubber MD (ed) Foundational texts in modern criminal law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 297–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Hirschauer N, Scheerer S (2014) Protective factors. In: Marciano G, Ramello GB (ed) Encyclopedia of law and economics. Springer, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  16. Hobbes T (1651) Leviathan: or the matter, forme, & power of a common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civilll (ed: Shapiro 2010). Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  17. Kahneman D (2011) Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  18. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263–291CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Katona G (1953) Rational behavior and economic behavior. Psychol Rev 60(5):307–318CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kolm SC (1973) A note on optimum tax evasion. J Public Econ 2:265–270CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Korobkin RB, Ulen TS (2000) Law and behavioral science: removing the rationality assumption from law and economics. Calif Law Rev 88(4):1051–1144CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Kovandzic TV, Vieraitis LM, Boots DP (2009) Does the death penalty save lives? New evidence from state panel data, 1977 to 2006. Criminol Public Policy 8(4):803–843CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Markowitz H (1952) The utility of wealth. J Polit Econ 60(2):151–158CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Miron AM, Brehm JW (2006) Reactance theory – 40 years later. Z Sozialpsychol 37:9–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Nielsen VL, Parker C (2012) Mixed motives: economic, social, and normative motivations in business compliance. Law Policy 34(4):428–462CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Ostrom E (2005) Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  27. Phelps ES, Pollak RA (1968) On second-best national saving and game-equilibrium growth. Rev Econ Stud 35:185–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Picciotto S (2002) Introduction: Reconceptualizing regulation in the era of globalization. J Law Soc 29(1):1–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Popitz H (1968) Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens. Dunkelziffer, Norm und Strafe. Mohr, TübingenGoogle Scholar
  30. Posner RA (2014) Economic analysis of law. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  31. Radbruch G (2011) Rechtsphilosophie. In: Dreier R, Paulson SL (eds) Studienausgabe, 2nd edn. C.F. Müller, HeidelbergGoogle Scholar
  32. Rubinstein A (1991) Comments on the interpretation of game theory. Econometrica 59(4):909–924CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Sandel MJ (2012) What money can’t buy – the moral limits of markets. Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar
  34. Simon HA (1955) A behavioral model of rational choice. Q J Econ 69(1):99–118Google Scholar
  35. Simon HA (1957) Models of man: social and rational. Wiley, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  36. Simons DJ, Chabris CF (1999) Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception 28(9):1059–1074CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Thaler RH (1991) The psychology of choice and the assumptions of economics. In: Thaler RH (ed) Quasi-rational economics. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, pp 137–166Google Scholar
  38. Thaler RH (1999) Mental accounting matters. J Behav Decis Mak 12(3):183–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Thaler RH (2016) Behavioral economics: past, present, and future. Am Econ Rev 106(7):1577–1600CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Thaler RH, Sunstein CR (2008) Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  41. The Behavioural Insights Team (2011) Behavioural insights team annual update 2010–11. Cabinet Office, LondonGoogle Scholar
  42. Tversky A, Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211(4481): 453–458CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  44. Weinstein ND, Klein WM (1996) Unrealistic optimism: present and future. J Soc Clin Psychol 15(1):1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Zimmerman PR (2004) State executions, deterrence, and the incidence of murder. J Appl Econ 7(1):163–193CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Agribusiness Management, Institute of Agricultural and Nutritional SciencesMartin Luther University Halle-WittenbergHalle (Saale)Germany