Justice delay is unanimously considered a negative externality both in terms of security and institutional trust (especially when referred to criminal cases) and in terms of economic development (especially when referred to civil cases). Despite several attempts to make systems more efficient have been taken in many countries, it is almost impossible to come to a unanimous solution able to fit different principles, structures, and procedures.
We review the economic literature on this topic, focusing on Gravelle’s (1990) theory and its applications.
It is a matter of fact that asking for justice in front of a court of law requires a very long time to get to a verdict in most of European and non-European countries. Justice delay is unanimously considered a negative externality both in terms of security and institutional trust and in terms of economic development. E.g., Jacobi and Shar (2015) pointed out that companies may prefer to breach a loss contract and...
- Bielen S, Marleffe W, Vereeck L (2015) An empirical analysis of case disposition time in Belgium. Rev Law Econ 11(2):293–316Google Scholar
- Buonanno P, Galizzi MM (2014) Advocatus, et non latro?: testing the excess of litigation in the Italian courts of justice. Rev Law Econ 10(3):285–322Google Scholar
- Buscaglia E, Dakolias M (1996) A quantitative analysis of the judicial sector: the cases of Argentina and Ecuador. World Bank technical paper no. 353Google Scholar
- Calvez F (2007) Length of court proceedings in the member states of the Council of Europe based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Council of Europe Publ, StrasbourgGoogle Scholar
- D’Agostino E, Sironi E, Sobbrio G (2012) Lawyers and legal disputes. Evidence from Italy. Appl Econ Lett 19(14):1349–1352Google Scholar
- D’Agostino E, Sironi E, Sobbrio G (2013) The length of legal disputes and the decision to appeal in Italian courts. Riv Ital degli Econ 18(1):47–63Google Scholar
- Dakolias M (1999) Court performance around the world: a comparative perspective, vol 23. World Bank Publications, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
- Di Vita G (2010) Production of laws and delays in court decisions. Int Rev Law Econ 30(3):276–281Google Scholar
- Di Vita G (2015) Centralization versus decentralization of legislative production and the effect on litigation: a case study. Rev Law Econ 11(2):267–291Google Scholar
- Djankov S, La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2003) Courts. Q J Econ 118(2):453–517Google Scholar
- Finocchiaro Castro M, Guccio C (2015) Bottlenecks or inefficiency? An assessment of first instance Italian courts’ performance. Rev Law Econ 11(2):317–354Google Scholar
- Gravelle H (1990) Rationing trials by waiting: welfare implications. Int Rev Law Econ 10:255–270Google Scholar
- Jacobi O, Sher N (2015) A commitment mechanism to eliminate willful contract litigation. Rev Law Econ 11(2):231–266Google Scholar
- Kim D, Min H (2017) Appeal rate and caseload: evidence from civil litigation in Korea. Eur J Law Econ 44(2):339–360Google Scholar
- Marchesi D (2007) The rule incentives that rule civil justice. ISAE working paper, no. 85Google Scholar
- Melcarne A, Ramello G (2015) Judicial independence, judges’ incentives and efficiency. Rev Law Econ 11(2):149–169Google Scholar
- Palumbo G, Sette E (2006) Delayed decision: an application to the court, Working paperGoogle Scholar
- Rosales V, Jiménez-Rubio D (2017) Empirical analysis of civil litigation determinants: the case of Spain. Eur J Law Econ 44(2):321–338Google Scholar
- Vereeck L, Muhl M (2000) An economic theory of court delay. Eur J Law Econ 10(3):243–268Google Scholar