Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

WTO: Procedural Rules

  • Yong-Shik LeeEmail author
  • Alessandro Romano
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_666

Abstract

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization plays a crucial role in resolving interstate trade disputes. This entry analyzes from a law and economics perspective some of the most important procedural rules of the DSM: (i) the standing, (ii) the allocation of litigation costs, and (iii) the existing remedies.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Law and Development InstituteDecaturUSA
  2. 2.China-EU School of LawChina University of Political Science and LawBeijingChina