Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Essential Facilities Doctrine

  • Frédéric MartyEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_659

Definition

The essential facility doctrine is a disputed concept in the field of competition law enforcement. According to this doctrine while a dominant operator controls an asset that its competitors cannot bypass to access the market because of its natural monopoly situation or because the unreasonableness of its replication in financial or in technical terms, it may be bound to provide them an access in fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. This approach may lead to far reaching remedies and is all the more challenged that it is also implemented to intangible assets.

Introduction

The essential facilities doctrine (hereafter the EFD) stems from the notion of market failure and, even more specifically, from the concept of natural monopoly. The EFD may be used in a situation in which an economic operator access to the market exclusively depends on the decision of a facility owner without any available alternative. The facility owner may be one of its competitors in the...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Areeda P (1990) essential facilities: an epithet in need of limiting principles. Antitrust Law J 58:841Google Scholar
  2. Bork R (1978) The antitrust paradox. Free Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  3. Bourreau M, Doan P, Manant M (2010) A critical review of the “ladder investment” approach. Telecommun Policy 34(11):683–696CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Carlton D, Heyer K (2008) Assessing single-firm conduct. Comp Policy Int 4(2):285–305Google Scholar
  5. Castaldo A, Nicita A (2007) Essential facility access in europe: building a test for antitrust policy. Rev Law Econ 3:83–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. de Hauteclocque A, Marty F, Pillot J (2011) The essential facilities doctrine in European competition policy: the case of the energy sector. In: Glachant J-M, Finon D, de Hauteclocque A (eds) Competition, contracts and electricity markets: a new perspective. Edward Elgar, London, pp 259–292Google Scholar
  7. Geradin D (2004) Limiting the scope of Article 82 of the EC treaty: what can the EU learn from the US Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom. Common Mark Law Rev 41:1519–1533Google Scholar
  8. Marty F, Pillot J (2012) Intellectual property rights, interoperability and compulsory licensing: merits and limits of the European approach. J Innov Econ 9(1):35–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Ridyard D (2004) Compulsory access under EU competition law: a new doctrine of “convenient facilities” and the case for price regulation. Eur Comp Law Rev 11:669–674Google Scholar
  10. Stigler GJ (1968) The organization of industry. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS - UMR 7321 GredegUniversité Côté d’Azur, Université Nice Sophia AntipolisValbonneFrance