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Concentrated Ownership

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Abstract

This entry summarizes the main theoretical contributions and empirical findings in relation to concentrated ownership from a law and economics perspective. The various forms of concentrated ownership are described as well as analyzed from the perspective of the legal protection of investors, especially minority shareholders. Concentrated ownership is associated with benefits and costs. Concentrated ownership may reduce agency costs by increased monitoring of top management. However, concentrated ownership may also provide dominating owners with private benefits of control.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Caspar Rose

Authors
  1. Caspar Rose
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Caspar Rose .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Rose, C. (2019). Concentrated Ownership. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_533

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