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Commons, Anticommons, and Semicommons

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Abstract

The notions of commons, anticommons, and semicommons are presented here to highlight their connections concerning how forms of ownership beyond the classical boundaries of private property affect the management of resources. While the three concepts have been presented as expressing specific dilemmas for the management of the resources or distinct property regimes, they may be seen as components of a unified interpretative framework which recognizes resources as collection of multiple attributes and addresses the complexity of mixed property regimes by studying the interaction of common and private uses.

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Correspondence to Enrico Bertacchini .

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Bertacchini, E. (2019). Commons, Anticommons, and Semicommons. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_532

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