Abstract
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits cartels and other antitrust agreements that reduce or eliminate competition between firms. Leniency programs are an important investigative tool which give cartel’s members incentives to report their cartel activity and cooperate with competition authorities. We present their main objectives, their development in different countries, their direct and indirect effects and how these programs could be improved.
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Further Reading
Brisset K, Thomas L (2004) Leniency program: a new tool in competition policy to deter cartel activity in procurement auctions. Eur J Law Econ 17(1):5–19
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Spagnolo G (2002) Leniency and whistle-blowers in antitrust. CEPR Discussion Papers 5794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
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Brisset, K. (2019). Leniency Programs. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_297
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_297
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