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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 467–471Cite as

Crime, Incentive to

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Abstract

The standard economic model of crime assumes criminal incentives depend on (1) the expected payoff from crime, (2) the penalty if apprehended and convicted, (3) the probability of apprehension and conviction, and (4) attitudes toward risk. At times, penalties for failed criminal attempts are also taken into account.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, BC, Canada

    Derek Pyne

Authors
  1. Derek Pyne
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Correspondence to Derek Pyne .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Pyne, D. (2019). Crime, Incentive to. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_245

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