Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Global Warming

  • Alfred EndresEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_193

Abstract

This essay analyses global warming from the perspective of environmental economic theory: National activities to curb greenhouse gas emissions are public goods. It is well known that the expectations to arrive at a satisfactory provision of these kinds of goods by uncoordinated decision-making are low. Nations try to overcome this dilemma by international treaty-making. However, economic analysis suggests that the genesis and persistence of international climate agreements are challenged by problems of national rationality and stability as well as by the leakage effect. On the other hand, economic analysis reveals some reasons for a more optimistic view. Among those are incentives to develop and introduce green technologies and incentives to adapt to changes in the world climate.

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References

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Further Reading

  1. Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New YorkGoogle Scholar
  2. Cherry TL, Hovi J, McEvoy DM (eds) (2014) Toward a new climate agreement. Conflict, resolution and governance. Routledge, Abingdon/New YorkGoogle Scholar
  3. Finus M, Kotsogiannis C, McCorriston S (eds) (2013a) The International dimension of climate change policy. Special Issue: Environ Resour Econ 56(2), 151–305Google Scholar
  4. Finus M, KotsogiannisC, McCorriston S (eds) (2013b) International coordination on climate policies. Special Issue: J Environ Econ Manag 66(2), 159–382Google Scholar
  5. Nyborg K (2012) The ethics and politics of environmental cost benefit analysis. Routledge, Abingdon/New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FernUniversität HagenHagenGermany