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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 879–884Cite as

Fiscal System

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Synonyms

Tax structure; Tax systems; Taxation

Definition

Fiscal systems gather all the taxes and contributions levied to fund the State. These taxes and contributions share the characteristics of being compulsory and unrequited payments to the government, in the OECD sense. Historically, fiscal systems have shown their scalable nature as they are embedded in larger economic, social, political, and cultural systems. It is possible to distinguish the positive analysis and the normative analysis of fiscal systems. The positive analysis enlightens fiscal systems characteristics in terms of tax structure, while the normative analysis questions the qualities of a good tax system.

Positive Analysis of Fiscal Systems

Fiscal systems are large collection processes aiming to fulfil the imperatives of financial returns, efficiency, and fairness associated with State intervention, as summarized by Musgrave in 1959, with the three-function framework. The first function, of resource allocation, is...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CEE-M – Univ Montpellier – CNRS – INRA – SupAgro, University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Cécile Bazart

  2. Laboratoire Montpellierain d’économie théorique et appliquée (LAMETA), University of Montpellier 1, Montpellier, France

    Cécile Bazart

Authors
  1. Cécile Bazart
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cécile Bazart .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Bazart, C. (2019). Fiscal System. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_176

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