Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Crime: Organized Crime and the Law

  • Matthew J. BakerEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_16

Abstract

This entry reviews the literature on the economics of organized crime. While the economics of organized crime is a small subfield of economics, it can offer insights in unexpected areas of economics. The field began some 40 years ago with the study of organized crime and its participation in illicit activities such as prostitution and gambling. Over time, the economic analysis of organized crime has expanded to address broader questions of governance in the absence of formal institutions.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNYNew YorkUSA