Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Nuisance

  • Keith N. HyltonEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_10

Abstract

This entry sets out the law and the economic theory of nuisance. Nuisance law serves a regulatory function: it induces actors to choose the socially preferred level of an activity by imposing liability when the externalized costs of the activity are substantially greater than the externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays a role in supplementing nuisance law.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Boston University School of LawBostonUSA