Non-empirical Values
Definition
Nonempirical values serve to delineate specific distinctions of scientific knowledge beyond empirical adequacy. Such values express requirements of significance and confirmation. The former are influential on the choice of problems and the pursuit of theories, the latter contribute to assessing the bearing of evidence on theory. Nonempirical values maybe epistemic (i.e., truth related) or non-epistemic (i.e., pragmatic, ethical, or utilitarian).
Background
The background of the claim that nonempirical values contribute to shaping the system of scientific knowledge is constituted by the Duhem–Quine underdetermination thesis (underdetermination). This thesis says that the agreement of the empirical consequences of a theory with the available observations is not a sufficient reason for accepting the theory. In other words, logic and experience leave room for conceptually incompatible but empirically equivalent explanatory alternatives. Consider the example of explaining a bunch...
References
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