This review is based on Villena and Villena (2004).
Synonyms
Definition
Social norms can be understood as standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs of how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation(Horne 2001) (see Voss 2001). The group can be a family, an organization, or a society. Members may follow the norm voluntarily if their individual preferences are consistent with the normative behavior, or they might be enforced by punishment if the differences between individual preferences and normative behavior result in a violation of the norm.
While social norms can be modeled using alternative theoretical learning models (see for instance, Young 1998), in this brief review we focus on the basic elements of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which has been widely used to formally study the conditions under which social norms may emerge and be established in society (Weibull 1996; Vega-Redondo 1996).
Theoretical...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Bowles, S. (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, institutions, and evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gintis, H. (2000). Game theory evolving. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Heifetz, A., Shannon, C., & Spiegel, Y. (2007). The dynamic evolution of preferences. Economic Theory, 32(2), 251–286.
Horne, C. (2001). Sociological perspectives on the emergence of social norms. In M. Hecheter & K. D. Opp (Eds.), Social norms. New York: Russell Sage.
Mailath, G. J. (1988). Do people play nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(3), 1347–1374.
Sethi, R., & Somanathan, E. (1996). The evolution of social norms in common property resource use. The American Economic Review, 86(4), 766–788.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1996). Evolution, games, and economic behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.
Villena, M. G., & Villena, M. J. (2004). Evolutionary game theory and Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary economics: Is EGT Veblenian? Journal of Economic Issues, 38(3), 585–610.
Voss, T. (2001). Game theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms. In M. Hecheter & K. D. Opp (Eds.), Social norms. Nueva York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Weibull, J. (1996). Evolutionary game theory. London: MIT Press.
Young, H. P. (1998). Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this entry
Cite this entry
Harrison, R., Villena, M.G. (2012). Learning and Evolution of Social Norms. In: Seel, N.M. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1428-6_633
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1428-6_633
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-1427-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-1428-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law