Learning and Evolution of Social Norms
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This review is based on Villena and Villena (2004).
Social norms can be understood as standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs of how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation(Horne 2001) (see Voss 2001). The group can be a family, an organization, or a society. Members may follow the norm voluntarily if their individual preferences are consistent with the normative behavior, or they might be enforced by punishment if the differences between individual preferences and normative behavior result in a violation of the norm.
While social norms can be modeled using alternative theoretical learning models (see for instance, Young 1998), in this brief review we focus on the basic elements of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which has been widely used to formally study the conditions under which social norms may emerge and be established in society (Weibull 1996; Vega-Redondo 1996).
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