It is a commonly held view that rights imply correlative obligations. That is, if someone has a right to x, then someone else (some person, group of people, institutions, etc.) bears some obligation, or duty, with respect to that right. Sorting out the nature of the obligations implied by rights, however, turns out to be a contentious matter. This is particularly the case in the context of debates about human rights and global justice, where difficult questions emerge about the nature of human rights, the correlative obligations they imply, and the bearers of these obligations. Of central concern in contemporary debates is the issue of whether the global poor have a human right to subsistence, and if so, what correlative obligations this right implies and for whom.

Traditionally, theorists have distinguished between negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights are rights to noninterference (e.g., the right not to be robbed, or assaulted, or in general deprived of some good),...