Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security

2005 Edition
| Editors: Henk C. A. van Tilborg

Universal One-Way Hash Functions

  • Bart Preneel
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23483-7_447
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A Universal One-Way Hash Function (UOWHF) is a class of hash functions indexed by a public parameter (called a key), for which finding a second preimage is hard. The main idea is that first the challenge input is selected, and subsequently the function instance (or parameter) is chosen. Only then should the opponent try to find a second input with the same output as the challenge. A UOWHF is a weaker notion than a collision resistanthash function (CRHF). In a CRHF, the opponent is first given the key and then he has to produce two colliding inputs. Finding collisions for a fixed parameter of a UOWHF may be rather easy, but this will not help the opponent to violate the security requirement, as the instance is chosen after the challenge. This also implies that the birthday paradox does not apply to a UOWHF and a hash result of 80 bits may offer adequate security (in 2004). Simon [8] has shown that there exists an oracle relative to which a UOWHF exists, but no CRHF.

The concept of UOWHF...

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References

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© International Federation for Information Processing 2005

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  • Bart Preneel

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