Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security

2005 Edition
| Editors: Henk C. A. van Tilborg

RSA Problem

  • Ronald L. Rivest
  • Burt Kaliski
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23483-7_363

Introduction

In RSA public-key encryption [ 30], Alice encrypts a plaintext M for Bob using Bob's public key ( n, e) by computing the ciphertext
$$ C = M^{ e}\!\!\!\! \pmod{n}, $$
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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald L. Rivest
  • Burt Kaliski

There are no affiliations available