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Corporate Governance

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Handbook of Cliometrics

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Abstract

This article provides information on how financiers of public limited companies in the past ensured that they achieved a return on and a return of their investment. I am investigating this with examples from the USA, Great Britain and Germany. First, I examine when and to what extent public limited companies were formed and whether and to what extent ownership and control were separate. Moreover, control and incentive mechanisms, e.g. monitoring by supervisory board or incentive pay to managers, are investigated.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Carsten Burhop

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  1. Carsten Burhop
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Correspondence to Carsten Burhop .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. BETA/CNRS, University of Strasbourg, Institute for Advanced Study, Strasbourg, France

    Claude Diebolt

  2. University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, La Crosse, WI, USA

    Michael Haupert

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Burhop, C. (2019). Corporate Governance. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00181-0_32

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