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De Jure/De Facto Institutions

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Abstract

Recent works in Law and Economics distinguish between the so-called de jure and de facto institutions. We define these two types of institutions, as well as indicate their place in the broad institutional system, in particular relative to the formal/informal and external/internal distinctions applied in (new) institutional economics. We also mention the possible interrelationships between de facto and de jure institutions, linking them to economic outcomes, and provide examples of de jure/de facto analyses in Law and Economics. Finally, we reflect on controversies and lacunas in the literature and present an outlook for future research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Jacek Lewkowicz & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Authors
  1. Jacek Lewkowicz
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  2. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacek Lewkowicz .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Lewkowicz, J., Metelska-Szaniawska, K. (2019). De Jure/De Facto Institutions. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_661

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