Definition
The tendency to consider the Behavioral Law and Economics and Cognitive Law and Economics as different sides of the same coin has been widespread inside the discipline. That was the consequence of a miscomprehension of what behavioral economics and cognitive economics are. These two research areas arise from a shared critique to standard neoclassical economics assumption of agents’ perfect rationality and a common idea that economic agents, in the real world, are heterogeneous and more cognitive complex than what the theory assumed, but soon they diverge pursuing different goals and partially applying different research tools. Particularly BL&E is more concerned with what agents do, while CL&E is more about how agents think.
Hence we need a proper discussion of what Cognitive Law and Economics is as well as we need a proper definition of Behavioral Law and Economics.
Introduction
Do we really need an autonomous definition for Cognitive Law and Economics or it is the same of...
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Ambrosino, A., Novarese, M. (2019). Cognitive Law and Economics. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_630
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