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Budgetary Institutions

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Abstract

Budgetary institutions encompass two different types of institutional arrangements: fiscal rules and budget process rules. Fiscal rules entail substantive constraints on public spending, taxation, deficit and debt, usually in the form of explicit quantitative targets. Budget process rules, in turn, entail procedural aspects of public budgeting: they establish the competencies of the actors involved in the budget process and outline the procedures that govern the preparation, adoption and implementation of the budget. This entry gives an overview of the different forms and characteristics of these institutions and also of their impact on budgetary outcomes.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Social Sciences, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Ringa Raudla

Authors
  1. Ringa Raudla
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Correspondence to Ringa Raudla .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Raudla, R. (2019). Budgetary Institutions. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_517

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