Overview
The economics of crime started with the seminal article by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker in 1968. He suggested the well-known high-fine-low-probability result, in a framework where rational criminals compare the benefit of violating the law with the possible cost (in terms of probability and severity of punishment). Legal economists have developed a theory of deterrence in the last 40 years to explain optimal punishment in multiple contexts. The main results as well as new insights provided by behavioral law and economics are reviewed.
Basic Model
The economic theory of criminal behavior is an application of the neoclassical theory of demand. Formalized by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker in 1968, it states that potential criminals are economically rational and respond significantly to the deterring incentives by the criminal justice system. They compare the gain from committing a crime with the expected cost, including the risk of punishment, the possibility of social stigma, and...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsRecommended Reading and References
Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76:169–217
Becker GS, Stigler GJ (1974) Law enforcement, malfeasance and compensation of enforcers. J Leg Stud 3:1–18
Bowles R, Garoupa N (1997) Casual police corruption and the economics of crime. Int Rev Law Econ 17:75–87
Echazu L, Garoupa N (2010) Corruption and the distortion of law enforcement effort. Am Law Econ Rev 10:162–180
Garoupa N (1997) The theory of optimal law enforcement. J Econ Surv 11:267–295
Garoupa N (2000) Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics 21:243–252
Garoupa N (2003) Behavioral economic analysis of crime: a critical review. Eur J Law Econ 15:5–15
Garoupa N (2007) Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization. J Econ Behav Organ 63:461–474
Levitt S, Miles T (2006) Economic contributions to the understanding of crime. Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 2:147–164
Levitt S, Miles T (2007) The empirical study of criminal punishment. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) The handbook of law and economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
McAdams R, Ulen TS (2010) Behavioral criminal law and economics. In: Garoupa N (ed) Criminal law and economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK
Polinsky AM, Rubinfeld DL (1991) A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders. J Public Econ 46:291–306
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (1984) The optimal use of fines and imprisonment. J Public Econ 24:89–99
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (1994) Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer? J Law Econ Organ 10:427–437
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (1998) On offense history and the theory of deterrence. Int Rev Law Econ 18:305–324
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2000) The economic theory of public enforcement of law. J Econ Literat 38:45–76
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2001) Corruption and optimal law enforcement. J Public Econ 81:1–24
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2007) The theory of public enforcement of law, In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) The handbook of law and economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Shavell S (1985) Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent. Columbia Law Rev 85:1232–1262
Shavell S (1990) Deterrence and the punishment of attempts. J Leg Stud 19:435–466
Shavell S (1992) A note on marginal deterrence. Int Rev Law Econ 12:345–355
Stigler GJ (1970) The optimum enforcement of laws. J Polit Econ 78:526–536
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this entry
Cite this entry
Garoupa, N. (2014). Economic Theory of Criminal Behavior. In: Bruinsma, G., Weisburd, D. (eds) Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_409
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_409
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-5689-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-5690-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law