1. Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

   • Özgür Kıbrıs

   Pages: 353 - 362

2. Positional independence in preference aggregation

   • Antonio Quesada

   Pages: 363 - 370

3. Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices

   • Szilvia Pápai

   Pages: 371 - 385

4. The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games

   • Vincent C. H. Chua
   • H. C. Huang

   Pages: 387 - 403

5. Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

   • Gaël Giraud
   • Céline Rochon

   Pages: 405 - 428

6. Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma

   • Drora Karotkin
   • Jacob Paroush

   Pages: 429 - 441

7. Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: An impossibility and some proposals

   • Yew-Kwang Ng
   • Guang-Zhen Sun
   • Guang-Zhen Sun

   Pages: 443 - 456

8. How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations

   • Fabio Maccheroni
   • Fabio Maccheroni
   • Massimo Marinacci

   Pages: 457 - 465

9. Flipping and ex post aggregation

   • Matthias Hild
   • Richard Jeffrey
   • Mathias Risse

   Pages: 467 - 475

10. Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners

    • Barış Kaymak
    • M. Remzi Sanver

    Pages: 477 - 494

11. Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain

    • Semih Koray
    • Bulent Unel

    Pages: 495 - 507

12. How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

    • Marco A. Haan
    • Peter Kooreman

    Pages: 509 - 522

13. Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize

    • Gerhard J. Woeginger

    Pages: 523 - 528