1. Scarcity, competition, and value

   • André Casajus
   • Harald Wiese

   Original Paper 12 May 2016 Pages: 295 - 310

2. Characterizations of perfect recall

   • Carlos Alós-Ferrer
   • Klaus Ritzberger

   Original Paper 19 May 2016 Pages: 311 - 326

   

3. Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation

   • Karl Jandoc
   • Ruben Juarez

   Original Paper 30 May 2016 Pages: 327 - 355

4. Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition

   • Dimitrios Xefteris
   • Didier Laussel
   • Michel Le Breton

   Original Paper 31 May 2016 Pages: 357 - 381

   

5. A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts

   • Jian Yang

   Original Paper 01 June 2016 Pages: 383 - 433

6. Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities

   • Mehmet Karakaya
   • Bettina Klaus

   Original Paper 02 June 2016 Pages: 435 - 455

7. Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality

   • Joseph Y. Halpern
   • Yoram Moses

   Original Paper 03 June 2016 Pages: 457 - 473

8. On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs

   • Michał Król

   Original Paper 07 June 2016 Pages: 475 - 486

9. Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems

   • Jaeok Park

   Original Paper 08 June 2016 Pages: 487 - 509

   

10. Strategic risk and response time across games

    • Pablo Brañas-Garza
    • Debrah Meloso
    • Luis Miller

    Original Paper 28 June 2016 Pages: 511 - 523

    

11. An axiomatic characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index

    • Hans Peters
    • José M. Zarzuelo

    Original Paper Open access 05 July 2016 Pages: 525 - 545

    

12. P-positions in modular extensions to Nim

    • Tanya Khovanova
    • Karan Sarkar

    OriginalPaper 20 July 2016 Pages: 547 - 561

    

13. On the drawbacks of large committees

    • Volker Hahn

    Original Paper 22 July 2016 Pages: 563 - 582

    

14. The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

    • Jonathan Newton

    OriginalPaper 26 July 2016 Pages: 583 - 589

15. Erratum to: A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium

    • Joseph Y. Halpern

    Erratum 01 June 2016 Pages: 591 - 594