1. Preface

   • Sylvain Sorin

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 1

2. A two armed bandit type problem

   • Michel Benaïm
   • Gerard Ben Arous

   Original paper Pages: 3 - 16

3. Positive value of information in games

   • Bruno Bassan
   • Olivier Gossner
   • Shmuel Zamir

   OriginalPaper Pages: 17 - 31

4. Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game

   • Pierre Cardaliaguet
   • Slawomir Plaskacz

   OriginalPaper Pages: 33 - 71

5. Stochastic games without perfect monitoring

   • J-M Coulomb

   OriginalPaper Pages: 73 - 96

6. Borel stay-in-a-set games

   • A. Maitra
   • W. Sudderth

   OriginalPaper Pages: 97 - 108

7. A value on ′AN

   • Jean-François Mertens
   • Abraham Neyman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 109 - 120

8. On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points

   • Andrzej S. Nowak

   Original paper Pages: 121 - 132

9. The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring

   • Dinah Rosenberg
   • Eilon Solan
   • Nicolas Vieille

   OriginalPaper Pages: 133 - 150

10. The reproducible properties of correct forecasts

    • Alvaro Sandroni

    OriginalPaper Pages: 151 - 159

11. Making solutions invariant

    • A. J. Vermeulen
    • M. J. M. Jansen
    • J. A. M. Potters

    Original paper Pages: 161 - 180