1. Two-person repeated games with finite automata

   • Abraham Neyman
   • Daijiro Okada

   Pages: 309 - 325

2. Population monotonic solutions on convex games

   • Toru Hokari

   Pages: 327 - 338

3. Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

   • Licun Xue

   Pages: 339 - 357

4. Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies

   • Jean-Pierre Beaud
   • Sylvain Sorin

   Pages: 359 - 364

5. Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains

   • Shinji Ohseto

   Pages: 365 - 374

6. Correlated equilibria of games with many players

   • Hans Keiding
   • Bezalel Peleg

   Pages: 375 - 389

7. Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies

   • Anton Stefanescu

   Pages: 391 - 412

8. First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

   • Gustavo E. Rodriguez

   Pages: 413 - 432

9. Player splitting in extensive form games

   • Andrés Perea y Monsuwé
   • Mathijs Jansen
   • Dries Vermeulen

   Pages: 433 - 450

10. Value theory without symmetry

    • Ori Haimanko

    Pages: 451 - 468