1. The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach

   • Yukihiko Funaki
   • Takehiko Yamato

   Pages: 157 - 171

2. Weighted nucleoli

   • Jean Derks
   • Hans Haller

   Pages: 173 - 187

3. Fictitious play in coordination games

   • Aner Sela
   • Dorothea Herreiner

   Pages: 189 - 197

4. The speed of rational learning

   • Alvaro Sandroni
   • Rann Smorodinsky

   Pages: 199 - 210

5. Prosperity properties of TU-games

   • J. R. G. van Gellekom
   • J. A. M. Potters
   • J. H. Reijnierse

   Pages: 211 - 227

6. On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games

   • Tamás Solymosi

   Pages: 229 - 240

7. Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game

   • Claudia Keser
   • Roy Gardner

   Pages: 241 - 252

8. On some properties of the ε-core of games with coalition structure

   • Akira Nakayama
   • Takeshi Naitoh

   Note Pages: 253 - 255