1. The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

   • Ezra Einy
   • Diego Moreno
   • Benyamin Shitovitz

   Pages: 1 - 14

2. The Folk theorem for dominance solutions

   • Alexander Vasin

   Pages: 15 - 24

3. The existence of TU α-core in normal form games

   • Jingang Zhao

   Pages: 25 - 34

4. “Costless” regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach

   • Moshe Bar Niv (Burnovski)
   • Israel Zang

   Pages: 35 - 52

5. Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games

   • P. Jean-Jacques Herings
   • Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

   Pages: 53 - 68

6. Recall in extensive form games

   • Klaus Ritzberger

   Pages: 69 - 87

7. Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence

   • Douglas D. Davis
   • Charles A. Holt

   Pages: 89 - 109

8. Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games

   • Dale O. Stahl

   Pages: 111 - 130

9. Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study

   • John Duffy
   • Nick Feltovich

   Pages: 131 - 152