1. A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games

   • M. Seetharama Gowda
   • Roman Sznajder

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 12

2. The consistency principle for games in strategic form

   • Bezalel Peleg
   • Stef Tijs

   OriginalPaper Pages: 13 - 34

3. A note on correlated equilibrium

   • Fe. S. Evangelista
   • T. E. S. Raghavan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 35 - 41

4. On quasi-stable sets

   • A. J. Vermeulen
   • J. A. M. Potters
   • M. J. M. Jansen

   OriginalPaper Pages: 43 - 49

5. Auctions with interdependent valuations

   • Peter Funk

   OriginalPaper Pages: 51 - 64

6. Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games

   • Ezra Einy
   • David Wettstein

   OriginalPaper Pages: 65 - 71

7. Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games

   • Daphne Koller
   • Nimrod Megiddo

   OriginalPaper Pages: 73 - 92

8. Zero-sum continuous games with no compact support

   • Luciano Méndez-Naya

   OriginalPaper Pages: 93 - 111

9. The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector

   • Luis M. Ruiz
   • Federico Valenciano
   • Jose M. Zarzuelo

   OriginalPaper Pages: 113 - 134

10. Announcement

    Announcement Pages: 135 - 135