1. Editorial

   • Dov Samet

   EditorialNotes Pages: 1 - 2

2. On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten

   • Eric van Damme

   OriginalPaper Pages: 3 - 11

3. The nucleolus for cooperative games with arbitrary bounds of individual rationality

   • Arkady Sobolev

   OriginalPaper Pages: 13 - 22

4. Representation of finite action large games

   • Kali P. Rath

   OriginalPaper Pages: 23 - 35

5. Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics

   • Nikolai S. Kukushkin

   OriginalPaper Pages: 37 - 48

6. Γ-component additive games

   • Jos Potters
   • Hans Reijnierse

   OriginalPaper Pages: 49 - 56

7. Set-valued nonlinear analogues of the shapley value

   • Sergei Pechersky
   • Arkady Sobolev

   OriginalPaper Pages: 57 - 78

8. A unifying approach to existence of nash equilibria

   • Erik J Balder

   OriginalPaper Pages: 79 - 94

9. The Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies

   • Olivier Gossner

   OriginalPaper Pages: 95 - 107

10. POOL — Listing service in game theory No.35

    Legacy Pages: 108 - 111

11. Announcement of Summer in Tel Aviv 1995

    Announcement Pages: 112 - 112