On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation Peter Kung OriginalPaper 04 July 2009 Pages: 1 - 17
The epistemic goal of a concept: accounting for the rationality of semantic change and variation Ingo Brigandt OriginalPaper 03 July 2009 Pages: 19 - 40
What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it Stephen Finlay OriginalPaper Open access 02 August 2009 Pages: 67 - 89
The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem Mark Newman OriginalPaper 25 July 2009 Pages: 111 - 138
Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem’s thesis revisited Darrell P. Rowbottom OriginalPaper 11 August 2009 Pages: 139 - 149