1. Introduction to the special issue “Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility”

   • Andrea Kruse
   • Heinrich Wansing

   S.I.: DoxasticAgency 12 July 2016 Pages: 2667 - 2671

2. Believing intentionally

   • Matthias Steup

   S.I.: DoxasticAgency 10 June 2015 Pages: 2673 - 2694

3. Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief

   • Hans Rott

   S.I.: Doxastic Agency 09 February 2016 Pages: 2695 - 2720

   

4. Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism

   • Nikolaj Nottelmann

   S.I. : Doxastic Agency 26 May 2015 Pages: 2721 - 2744

5. Attitudinal control

   • Conor McHugh

   OriginalPaper 15 January 2015 Pages: 2745 - 2762

6. Agency of belief and intention

   • A. K. Flowerree

   S.I.: DoxasticAgency 18 June 2016 Pages: 2763 - 2784

7. On the analogy of free will and free belief

   • Verena Wagner

   S.I. : DoxasticAgency Open access 22 August 2015 Pages: 2785 - 2810

8. Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control

   • Andrea Kruse

   S.I.: DoxasticAgency 27 October 2015 Pages: 2811 - 2842

9. Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination

   • Heinrich Wansing

   S.I.: DoxasticAgency 23 October 2015 Pages: 2843 - 2861

   

10. Should have known

    • Sanford C. Goldberg

    OriginalPaper 30 January 2015 Pages: 2863 - 2894

11. Responsible belief and epistemic justification

    • Rik Peels

    S.I.: DoxasticAgency 13 February 2016 Pages: 2895 - 2915

12. A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance

    • Stephan Krämer

    OriginalPaper 29 March 2016 Pages: 2917 - 2930

    

13. Wigner’s puzzle and the Pythagorean heuristic

    • Jane McDonnell

    OriginalPaper 06 April 2016 Pages: 2931 - 2948

14. Inscrutability and visual objects

    • Ben Phillips

    OriginalPaper 11 April 2016 Pages: 2949 - 2971

    

15. Virtuous distinctions

    • Will Fleisher

    OriginalPaper 11 April 2016 Pages: 2973 - 3003

16. Why broad content can’t influence behaviour

    • Cressida Gaukroger

    OriginalPaper 18 April 2016 Pages: 3005 - 3020

17. A Russellian account of suspended judgment

    • Philip Atkins

    OriginalPaper 21 April 2016 Pages: 3021 - 3046

18. Time, change and time without change

    • Ken Warmbrod

    OriginalPaper 21 April 2016 Pages: 3047 - 3067

19. Two new objections to explanationism

    • Bryan C. Appley
    • Gregory Stoutenburg

    OriginalPaper 21 April 2016 Pages: 3069 - 3084

20. Rejecting Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent-causation

    • Jordan Baker

    OriginalPaper 28 April 2016 Pages: 3085 - 3100

21. How to expect a surprising exam

    • Brian Kim
    • Anubav Vasudevan

    OriginalPaper 10 May 2016 Pages: 3101 - 3133

    

22. Distributed selves: personal identity and extended memory systems

    • Richard Heersmink

    OriginalPaper 28 April 2016 Pages: 3135 - 3151

23. Epistemic inconsistency and categorical coherence: a study of probabilistic measures of coherence

    • Michael Hughes

    OriginalPaper 30 May 2016 Pages: 3153 - 3185