On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy Clark RobinsonGerry L. Suchanek OriginalPaper Pages: 313 - 335
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation Shmuel Nitzan OriginalPaper Pages: 349 - 370
A precise restatement and extension of Black's theorem on voting orders Richard G. NiemiRodney J. Gretlein OriginalPaper Pages: 371 - 376
Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity Sven Berg OriginalPaper Pages: 377 - 387
A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions Samuel Merrill III OriginalPaper Pages: 389 - 403
An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections Lee E. Dutter OriginalPaper Pages: 405 - 424