On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics Frans van Winden OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 29
Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules: An equilibrium rescued Douglas D. DavisRobert J. Reilly OriginalPaper Pages: 31 - 38
The two freedoms, economic growth and development: An empirical study Wenbo WuOtto A. Davis OriginalPaper Pages: 39 - 64
Structural constraints on partisan bias under the efficient gerrymander Thomas W. GilliganJohn G. Matsusaka OriginalPaper Pages: 65 - 84
Are economists more selfish than other 'social' scientists? David N. LabandRichard O. Beil OriginalPaper Pages: 85 - 101
Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting James Adams OriginalPaper Pages: 103 - 122
Lowering the cost of pollution control versus controlling pollution Dwight R. Lee OriginalPaper Pages: 123 - 134
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 320 pages. $85.00. Paul H. Rubin OriginalPaper Pages: 135 - 137
Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini with Gerald D. Cohen, Political cycles and the macroeconomy. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997. 302 pages. $20.00 (paper). Richard E. Wagner OriginalPaper Pages: 137 - 140
Paul Johnson, A history of the American people. New York: Harper Collins, 1997. xv + 1088 pages. $35 (cloth). Charles K. Rowley OriginalPaper Pages: 140 - 149
Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. xv + 542 pages. $65.00. Ronald N. Johnson OriginalPaper Pages: 149 - 152
D. Eric Schansberg, Poor policy: How government harms the poor. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. xxii + 244 pages. $35.00. Adam Gifford Jr. OriginalPaper Pages: 152 - 156
