1. Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity

   • Yoram Barzel
   • Robert T. Deacon

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 14

2. Bureaucrats and public goods

   • Walter Hettich

   OriginalPaper Pages: 15 - 25

3. Viability, preference, and coalitions in the french election of 1951

   • Howard Rosenthal

   OriginalPaper Pages: 27 - 39

4. Competing for aid

   • Gordon Tullock

   OriginalPaper Pages: 41 - 51

5. The logic of bureaucratic back scratching

   • Robert E. Goodin

   OriginalPaper Pages: 53 - 67

6. Progressive tax reform and majority voting

   • P. M. Pestieau

   OriginalPaper Pages: 69 - 78

7. On the form of special interest legislation

   • Paul H. Rubin

   OriginalPaper Pages: 79 - 90

8. Self-generating growth in public programs

   • Richard Craswell

   Notes Pages: 91 - 97

9. A comment on ‘democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model.’

   • Bernard Grofman

   Notes Pages: 99 - 103

10. Institutional entropy

    • Barry Keating
    • Maryann Keating

    Notes Pages: 105 - 106

11. Logrolling and the arrow paradox: A note

    • Nicholas R. Miller

    Notes Pages: 107 - 110

12. Is a paretian liberal really impossible: A reply

    • Amartya Sen

    Notes Pages: 111 - 113

13. A comment on McCaleb's “The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions”

    • Richard J. Stoll

    Notes Pages: 115 - 116

14. Leibenstein's bandwagon effect as applied to voting

    • Charles E. Zech

    Notes Pages: 117 - 122

15. Reviews

    • Jeffrey A. Smith

    BookReview Pages: 123 - 124