1. Models for the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies during an election campaign

   • W. D. Cook
   • M. J. L. Kirby
   • S. L. Mehndiratta

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 16

2. Monopolistic trading economies: A case of governmental control

   • Amoz Kats

   OriginalPaper Pages: 17 - 32

3. Single-peakedness and guttman scales: Concept and measurement

   • Richard G. Niemi
   • Herbert F. Weisberg

   OriginalPaper Pages: 33 - 45

4. A model of regulatory agency behavior

   • Milton Russell
   • Robert B. Shelton

   OriginalPaper Pages: 47 - 62

5. Collective consumption of private goods

   • Robert M. Spann

   OriginalPaper Pages: 63 - 81

6. The economics of campaign funds

   • William P. Welch

   OriginalPaper Pages: 83 - 97

7. Is a paretian liberal really impossible?

   • Peter Bernholz

   Notes Pages: 99 - 107

8. Potential theft as indirect taxation

   • Richard J. Cebula
   • Paul K. Gatons

   Notes Pages: 109 - 111

9. The cost of internal organization: A suggested simplification

   • Andrew J. Gold

   Notes Pages: 113 - 116

10. The economic theory of representative government: A review

    • Jean-Luc Migué

    Review Articles Pages: 117 - 128

11. The economic theory of representative government: A reply

    • Albert Breton

    Review Articles Pages: 129 - 133

12. Book reviews

    • Russell Hardin
    • Richard M. Merelman
    • Wilber A. Chaffee

    BookReview Pages: 135 - 141