Volume 2, Issue 3 | Economics of Governance

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Volume 2, Issue 3

November 2001

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4 articles in this issue

The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not
Stergios Skaperdas
Original papers Pages: 173 - 202
Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games
Silvia Fedeli
Michele Santoni
Original papers Pages: 203 - 229
Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players
Nuno Garoupa
Original papers Pages: 231 - 242
The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills
Ruth Ben-Yashar
Shmuel Nitzan
Original papers Pages: 243 - 249